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In this paper, I attempt to show that Levinas’s thesis “ethics as first philosophy” implies a com-
plex approach to philosophical discourse as well as to language. I hope to demonstrate that, 
according to Levinas, the pattern of reading and debating produced by the long tradition of 
Western philosophical thinking has to be revised. This implies several conceptual steps which 
could be described as ethical exegesis and ethical body. The ethical exegesis manifests a prac-
tice of listening to and being for the other interlocutor, that primarily directed to the embod-
ied subject in all its vivacity of life. Adhering to phenomenological tradition I explore Levinas’s 
account of language — the saying and the said, to show that the core of the linguistic structure 
is sensibility and embodied proximity. My main argument is that Levinas does not only revise 
the work of language in philosophical discourse, but he also finds another approach to dia-
logue, response, and listening. In other words, objectifying language becomes posterior and 
is subordinated to ethical exegesis that is described as an encounter with the embodied other. 
I also draw attention to specific structures of sensibility and proximity which are necessary 
components of the ethical body. One of the important theses to follow up is that Levinas’s 
continual refinement of the concept of exegesis is necessary for retracing an approach to the 
transcendence in a dialogue of two interlocutors. 
Keywords: Levinas, ethics, exegesis, embodiment, proximity, sensibility, ethical body, language, 
saying, said. 
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Introduction
Being the birthplace and home for all reasoning and deliberate thinking, philosophy 
gave rise to ethics, aesthetics, and science. Born within the realm of Western philosophy 
the ‘science’ gradually became a core stone that has been ruling and dominating almost 
any discourse over the last two and a half millennia. From the first glance, Levinas in-
deed reads the history of philosophy as a source of concepts and inspirations for mod-
ern science. However, he approaches the history of philosophy in a very ambiguous way. 
Constantly not only addressing the heritage of history of philosophy in his texts but also 
building up his ethics on it, he does not have in mind a very halloed and highly respected 
discipline with impressive compendiums of texts, rather he discloses it as a great poten-
tiality for modern sciences and a possibility for integrated technologies. However, it also 
seems that Levinas reads the history of philosophy in a very critical way as being a rigid 
construction seeking out the truth and being obsessed by the eternal appearance of “the 
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real things”, and where quaint and bizarre phenomena were constantly dismissed and out-
cast. In short, following Levinas’s reading the history of philosophy also promotes science 
as the first philosophy. Another critical view elucidates Levinas’s interpretation of the his-
tory of philosophy seen as a history of ontology where the primacy of ontology tends to 
encompass the diversity of all phenomena within comprehension and to reduce plurality 
to the unity.
Now, by keeping these perspectives in mind, I would like to turn to Totality and Infin-
ity, where Levinas elaborates his famous thesis — “ethics is first philosophy”. The exposi-
tion of this thesis does not touch upon the philosophical content or essence of ethics, 
Levinas’s project is to turn attention to ethics as one, which is occupying the first and the 
privileged position within a philosophical kingdom. Levinas begins by saying that one 
should question the status and the hierarchy: the long run of the history of Western phi-
losophy is a constant struggle for the truth, attempting to bring into presence the triumph 
of science. The ethics, then, being restricted to imperative, has occupied the second or 
even third place after science. Being knowledge of science and truth, the philosophical re-
flection was always the first practice, and only after which ethics egresses. However, to say 
that “ethics is first philosophy” is something radically new in the history of philosophical 
thought is not completely fair. As has been shown in his works, Levinas indeed addresses 
Kant and is in accord with him in many places. Kant affirms the primacy of ethics — “the 
primacy of practical reason”, however, his ethics was always unfolding itself as the ethics 
of rationality in the sense that it discusses a morality conforming to and subordinated to 
the standards of science. 
Moving from Kantian realm Levinas’s ambiguous projects proposes to conceive ethics 
ethically. He attacks the hegemony exercised by the circling play of truth and knowledge 
and by widely accepted rules of an epistemologically oriented philosophy, i.e. philosophy 
contributing to fields of science. The shift Levinas makes is articulated around the state-
ment that ethics is not just grounded in the power of reason but on the surplus of morality. 
The simplicity of this idea has a hidden difficulty which does not directly concern philo-
sophical practice and method but the acts of morality. Otherwise than Being Levinas’s cut-
ting edge comment says that “No one is good voluntarily” [1, p. 11]. Indeed, the care and 
responsibility for the other before oneself interrupts the vitality of one’s own life, energies, 
and enjoyment. To some extent the care for the other also leads to a restriction of free-
dom of the self, it restrains speech, possibly limits resources and breaks through widely 
accepted standards of our knowledge. Thus, Levinas’s thesis ‘to see ethics as first philoso-
phy’ is no longer to perform philosophical questioning in the first place, rather it would 
lead to the questioning of philosophical discourse itself. In many cases of philosophical 
discussion, the motivational standpoint would be to grasp the nature and the meaning 
of science. This, of course, would lead to the bigger discussion with a focus on Levinas’s 
profound account of science, truth, and technology initiated by the whole tradition of the 
history of western philosophy. However, this is not a topic of this paper, and, to summarise 
a general context of this discussion, I shall add that for Levinas the relationship between 
philosophy, search for truth and ethics should be reformulated: one must approach and 
understand the ethics of the history of philosophy and philosophical practice, and the 
ethics that constitute science. 
To conclude a brief introduction, I accentuate that Levinas understands the search 
for the truth certainly not just as a function of pure mind conversing silently, transpar-
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ently, and simultaneously with itself, neither the truth is extracted from the causality of the 
material world. Rather, it is inextricably linked to the human realm and human interests. 
Therefore, Levinas’s approach to philosophy starts with ethics, and precisely with ethics 
of communication which is the sensibility and responsiveness of one singular embod-
ied human being. The face of the other breaks the sophisticated quest of the history of 
philosophy, and it breaks its historical and linguistic context. Thus, the first world of any 
philosophical discussion is not spoken or written but, as Levinas would put it, it is a sig-
nification of sensibility. It is an embodied word prior to all words but which would also be 
the cause of all other words and speech. Prior to anything said, including the proposition 
of scientific knowledge with all its methodology and formulas, at the very possibility of 
meaningfulness we are faced by what is said by one person to another, in other words, 
before the formation of any knowledge there is embodied sensibility of listening.
There are many questions and ideas that I would like to address in this paper. I believe 
that Levinas’s thesis “ethics as first philosophy” implies a more complex approach which 
could be grasped in terms of ‘ethical exegesis’. I will show that ethical exegesis derives from 
Levinas’s account of language and discloses sensibility and proximity in the form of the 
saying. My main argument is that Levinas does not only revise the work of language but he 
also finds another approach to dialogue, response and listening by introducing two means 
or two ‘effective’ solutions — ethical exegesis and ethical body, or, the ethical sensibility 
that can shed light on the philosophical practice1. 
Ethical exegesis, language, and proximity
Before I give an extended analysis of the role of ethical exegesis I shall elucidate the 
theme of language in Levinas’s ethics. Outside any discursive formulation, the relation 
with the other person opens itself in the language which is revealed through the notion of 
the said and the saying. The issue of language becomes more fully orchestrated in Other-
wise than Being or Beyond the Essence. I will briefly describe the key features of Levinas’s 
understanding of language. 
The structure of any linguistic act is regulated by two intertwined concepts: the said 
and the saying. In Levinas’s interpretation, the said (le dit) belongs to an objectifying 
sphere. It can also be described as originality of the I experience, i.e., the ability to state 
‘I am this’. The saying (le dire) is recalled to tear the totality of the subject’s being as it is 
expressed in the said. It demolishes the limits of language as a settled and logically organ-
ized structure. 
To represent alterity and to catch it in the experience of consciousness means to find 
a certain meaning or to signify: “To present oneself as signifying is to speak. This presence 
affirmed in the presence of the image as the focus of the gaze that is fixed on you, is said” 
[3, p. 66]. According to Levinas, what is expressed is also united with what speaks, the 
speech of the other is always presented in the form of imperative. Levinas introduces the 
idea of language as an event of the immediate relation with the other. This language is dif-
ferent from the objectifying language of things and the world; it gives access to the other: 
“the relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of 
1 Richard A. Cohen has elaborated on ethical exegesis in his book Levinasian Meditation. Ethics, 
Philosophy and Religion [2, p. 94–106]. His discusses ethical exegesis in the context of philosophical dialogue, 
ethics of commentary and engagement of the reader. 
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the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me” [3, p. 73]. It is only in responding to the 
other that language is born as an intersubjective system. To put it differently, objectifying 
language becomes posterior and is subordinated to ethical language that is primordially 
described as an encounter with the other. As Levinas states, “discourse is thus the experi-
ence of something absolutely foreign, a pure “knowledge” or “experience”, a traumatism of 
astonishment” [3, p. 73].
It seems to be insufficient to explain language as a ground for dialogue and for the 
transformation of an individual. Language is the saying in relation to the other and for 
the other, preceding thematization in which different qualities of the phenomenon are 
gathered to a sort of unity [1, p. 37–38]. Levinas suggests that “the poem is situated at the 
moment of pure touching, pure contact, grasping, squeezing — which is perhaps a way of 
giving, right up to and including the hand that gives. A language of proximity…older than 
the truth of being…by its for-the-other, the whole marvel of giving” [4, p. 41]. The saying 
is a possibility to approach the infinite; it is a liberation from my own subjectivity. In the 
saying, I can offer myself to the other and find my being as a being-for-the-other. This of-
fering is a space where responsibility is supposed to be born. In Heidegger’s interpretation 
language articulates itself, and the concept of language does not place subjectivity in ques-
tion within the appearance and appeal of the other [1, p. 47].
Critchley points out that one significant achievement of Levinas’ work Otherwise 
than Being or beyond the Essence is the structure of the saying and the said, that is, how 
the ethical could signify within an ontological language [5, p. 164] The saying is a pure 
sensibility and openness towards the other; it is affectivity, and it is my inability to refuse 
the other’s approach [1, p. 48–49]. It is thought of as a performative stating or expressive 
that describes myself facing the other. The said is disclosed as a judgment about which the 
truth or falsity can be ascertained. Critchley specifies that Levinas’ whole project unfolds 
around one question: how can the saying, my exposure to the other, be said or described 
in philosophical exposition without finally betraying this saying?
The saying is not the permanent Husserlian epoché of the said; rather, the reduction in 
the exposure of the saying by way of a continual contestation of the said. The task is to pass 
beneath or beyond the said to that dimension of experience which transcends the realm of 
the said towards the other person in its infinite unspeakability. Then, the reduction should 
take place within the said by interrupting it. Critchley notices that reduction could never 
be complete: it uses the language of the said and, at the same time, it tries to avoid it. The 
crucial moment of this process is that this reduced said contains a residue of the unsaid 
said within the saying: “[the] saying has to be reached in its existence antecedent to the 
said, or else he said has to be reduced to it” [1, p. 46]. Thus, the philosophical discourse 
moves in a spiral way between two orders of discourse: between the saying and the said, 
whereby the ethical signifies or shines through the alternation of these orders.
This thesis can also be illustrated by the quote where Levinas addresses Plato: “Plato 
maintains the difference between the objective order of truth, that which doubtlessly is 
established in writings, impersonally, and reason in a living being, “a living and animated 
discourse,” a discourse thus “capable of ” defending itself, and which knows those to whom 
it should be addressed and before whom it should be silent” (Phaedrus, 276a). This dis-
course is therefore not the unfolding of prefabricated internal logic, but the constitution of 
truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all the risks of freedom. The relationship of lan-
guage implies the transcendence, the radical separation, the strangeness of interlocutors, 
360 Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 3
the revelation of the other to me. In other words, language is spoken where a community 
between the terms of the relationship is wanting, where a common plane is wanting or is 
yet to be constituted. It takes place in this transcendence” [3, p. 73].
However, the question remains: how to maintain the transcendence in relation with 
language? I believe that one of the promising solutions Levinas gradually develops is the 
notion of exegesis that also leads him to focus on the ethical of exegetic practice. At first 
glance, a very common reading of exegesis explains it as a response to the text. In the theo-
logical context, the term ‘exegesis’ stands together with ‘hermeneutics’, however, is both an 
interpretation of the biblical script, exegesis is applied the practice of interpretation while 
hermeneutics works with an articulation of concrete rules of interpretation. For Levinas, 
the ethical exegesis is not just a notion he refers to in Totality and Infinity but also a meth-
od that expresses and aims at the ‘saying’ of the ‘said’. In other words, it deepens ethical 
conditions, whether they are explicitly acknowledged or not, of the text and speech. The 
notion of ethical exegesis was also emphasized and elaborated by Richard A. Cohen in his 
outstanding book Levinasian Meditations. Following Levinas’s path of reading, he articu-
lated four interrelated dimensions of ethical exegesis among which “pluralism of persons 
and readings” and “virtue, or existential self-transformative wisdom” are of special interest 
in the current discussion [2, p. 94]. 
The existential self-transformative path, revealed in the practice of ethical exegesis, 
is bound, according to Cohen’s interpretation, to “relevant hermeneutics”. This is a move-
ment of sympathetic entering into texts together with an inner understanding that applies 
to the vivacity of life and the sensibility of experience and not only to the intellectual 
engagement of the reader. The dominating critical attitude in reading often lacks this sym-
pathetic sensibility and sacrifices it to the objectivity of knowledge and the purity of the 
methodology of reading. Alternatively, exegesis is about showing how the ethical signifies 
within an ontological language. To put it differently, exegesis is also a model of the say-
ing and he said that explains an experience of being transformed by the text and within 
which the reader can unfold its sensible self: “Exegesis made the text speak; while critical 
philosophy speaks of the text. The one takes the text to be a source of teaching, the other 
treats it as a thing” [6, p. 263]. Broadly stated, the ethical exegesis does not neglect a critical 
approach to the text but tends to emphasize the teaching wrapped in texts. In this com-
pact sentence, Richard Cohen finds a residue of an absolute transcendence of dialogue. 
And this is exactly what Levinas’s objective is to establish proximity of two speakers who 
remain separate yet united and who are able of retaining their individuality. Thus, the 
ethical exegesis would be a move that forms relations within the text and where “the tran-
scendence is proper to the discourse from out of which the relative transcendence of true 
knowledge is discovered” [2, p. 103].
In a more detailed exposition, the ethical exegesis aims to preserve the saying of the 
said and to create the ethical conditions for the search of truth. These ethical conditions 
address first of all sensible embodied person to whom, following Levinas’s line of reflec-
tion, the Western philosophical tradition was blind. “Truth arises where a being separated 
from the other is not engulfed in him, but speaks to him. Language, which does not touch 
the other, even tangentially, reaches the other by calling upon him or by commanding 
him or by obeying him, with all the straightforwardness of these relations” [3, p. 62]. Now, 
coming back to mentioned Levinas’s quote referring to Plato’s Phaedrus. In the history of 
philosophy, Plato’s dialogues stand as a wonderful example of how exegesis works. Levinas 
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believes that the skills, the art, and spirit Plato employs in his dialogues, preserve the unity 
in difference and a relation of a non-indifference of one person to another, or, in other 
words, preserve responsibility of one interlocutor for the other. 
Thus, ethical exegesis turns to be not only a praxis of interpreting but also an in-
teraction of encounters and their inspiring ideas, utopias and it is also the proximity 
of embodied individuals expressed in the interplay of the saying and the said. The way 
Levinas approaches Plato’s text is that Plato adopts a similar strategy to the one used in 
the interpretation of Talmud. Cohen notices that a distinctive feature of Plato’s is not the 
dialogical form itself but our commentary which is activated and is living at the very 
moment when we are engaging ourselves, “when we ‘take it to heart’, because are able 
of distancing of academic jargon” [2, p. 105]. In Totality and Infinity Levinas writes: “it 
belongs to the very essence of language, which consists in continually undoing its phrase 
by the forward or the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without cer-
emonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the 
said delights” [3, p. 30].
In the first moment of reading, the textual voice or surface seeks for an embodied per-
son. The intriguing answer Cohen gives in Levinasian Meditations is that “no interlocutor 
too important to be challenged or too insignificant to be ignored, because it is a text driven 
by a moral desire, or more precisely, by a holy compassion for others, to alleviate the suf-
fering of others, and to in this way come close to God, to bring God’s will to earth and to 
raise human will to God” [2, p. 104].
One of the further possible ways of exploring this theme would be to address Critch-
ley’s account of language. In The Ethics of Deconstruction Critchley proposes ‘clôtural’ 
reading as a critical step towards the history of philosophy. ‘Сlôtural reading’ comprises a 
double structure involved in reading the text. Critchley explains it as follows: to preserve 
the question of ethics, the text is analyzed “in terms of how it is divided against itself 
in both belonging to logocentric conceptuality and achieving the breakthrough beyond 
that conceptuality” [5, p. 30]. The interesting point Critchley is making is that conceptual 
insight of the ‘clôtural reading’ is grounded on deconstructive reading. On the one side, 
‘clôtural reading’ is adjusted to a logocentric epoch that is closed and on the other side, 
as Critchley explains it, it also requires a deconstructive reading which is constantly dis-
turbing this closure and is disrupting the flow of the philosophical discourse in order to 
allow the appearance of alterity. This incoming movement of alterity interrupts “any unity 
of logocentric textuality and epochality” [5, p. 30]. Thus, the notion of ‘clôtural reading’ 
opens up a possibility of questioning the ethics, but also it stands close to what Levinas 
articulates as the ethical exegesis. It is clear that Critchley also views ‘clôtural’ reading to 
be a method of reading the history of philosophy seen from the standpoint of the oth-
ers, of alterity, of embodied interlocutors, and of the victims of that history; the idea of 
‘clôtural’ reading is to speak out the ethical history which corresponds to the practice of 
ethical exegesis. Critchley writes that “‘clôtural’ reading articulates the ethical interrup-
tion of ontological closure, thereby disrupting the text’s claim to comprehensive unity and 
self- understanding” [5, p. 30]. The purpose of this reading as well as of ethical exegesis is 
to reveal a diversity of insights, interruptions, or alterities hidden in the text and which 
are the moments of ethical transcendence. In this way, within the practice of reading the 
language of ethics would be an event where the saying shines through the ontological 
exposition of the said. 
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John Llewelyn provides another inspiring reading of exegesis in Levinas’s ethics. To 
perform ethical exegesis is to hear and to listen (écouter, entendre). Listening is not just an 
active engagement but, to some extent, a traumatic passivity where the embodied self is 
turned out and is forced to obey. Llewelyn goes on to articulate that the trope “by which 
the inner ear turns to Autrui, is the turning of my skin inside out, it is the turning of the 
ego into itself, a self whose responding to the other is its obedience, an obedience prior to 
the knowledge of what it is commanded” [7, p. 184]. Llewelyn adopts a similar argument 
with respect to Levinas’s idea of exegesis, however, he radicalizes it by articulating ines-
capability of response and obedience. These are the tropes found in exegetic practice and 
‘clôtural’ reading, and they are already before any layer of information comes into play. 
Llewelyn’s understanding of the concept of language and interpretation in Levinas’s ethics 
are also challenging. He points an important moment that the discourse of communica-
tion is the one-way communication of the self to the other where the performed saying is 
not the saying of the said of the message. Moreover, if to express it in French, the saying 
is se dire, and ‘se’ indicates an accusative form of the self; the accused me and my saying 
signifies a gesture of giving of myself to the other. In Llewelyn’s terms, it is a radicalization 
of ethical exegesis, but the opening up initiated by the exegetical method leads to being 
disquieted by the other [7, p. 184].
On the first opening page of Otherwise than Being of Beyond the Essence Levinas 
quotes Rachi, the medieval commentator of the Talmud: “The sages have said, Do not 
read ‘begin at my sanctuary’, but ‘begin with those that sanctify me’< …> as teaches the 
Talmudic Treatise, Sabbath, 55a” (Ezekiel 9: 6). The reason why Levinas refers to Rachi is 
to show, in an indirect way, that the whole text of Otherwise than Being is formed as an 
exegetical response, an attempt to maintain silence and responsibility in writing for. I sug-
gest that already this short passage points to the practice of ethical. 
Before I move to the idea of the ethical body there is still one more important point to 
add to the discussion. Involving interlocutors of flesh and blood, in all the vivacity of their 
life, ethical exegesis also concerns sensibility, sensation, and proximity which in their turn 
condition ethical body. The speaker, or the other delivering a message, is unreachable for 
thematizing consciousness. However, Levinas affirms it can be accessible in proximity [1, 
p. 88]. He discloses verbal discourse not only as an additional component to the knowl-
edge that can be recognized. Verbal discourse arises from the proximity preceding the 
pronunciation, that is, he reserves a privileged place for non-verbal communication. In 
Totality and Infinity Levinas writes that “the eyes break through the mask — the language 
of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks” [3, p. 66]. Most ap-
propriately, the ethical relation to the other interlocutor should not be brought back only 
to speech, but it can signify ethically by non-verbal indicative signs. However, the notion 
of proximity as non-verbal communication differs from the perception of the visual. Let 
us remind ourselves of Husserl’s account of sensible intuition which is actually based on 
the perception of a visual image; it is the primacy of vision upon senses. In Levinas’s view, 
the real meaning of sensation is hidden not in the process of receiving information which 
happens as a result of our proximity to objects. If sensation is read as a fulfillment of in-
tention, then this understanding of intention is totally wrong since the real intuition can 
never be accomplished; it is unsatisfied. Also, Levinas points out that a particular feature 
of sensation is that it happens. It is a meaningful event which happens between the feel-
ing and the felt. Not only was the notion of sensation transformed in our contemporary 
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culture. Touch was also reconsidered as a way of receiving information. Touch in Levinas’s 
phenomenology is a certain concentration of knowledge on the surface of an object. This 
means that a new notion which can reflect and conceptualize the idea of feeling (visual 
and tactile) is needed, and it partly explains Levinas’s invention of proximity. The notion 
of proximity reconsiders the visual and tactile sensation; they are no more subjected to 
language as the said. 
Why does Levinas accentuate the notion of proximity and sensibility within the 
ethical explanation of language structure? Proximity, as a mode of describing the saying, 
does not presuppose a spatial location. Levinas writes: “Proximity is a relationship with 
a singularity, without the mediation of any principle or ideality. In the concrete, it de-
scribes my relationship with the neighbor, a relationship whose signifyingness is prior 
to the celebrated ‘sense bestowing” [1, p. 100]. Proximity becomes a newborn intention-
ality for Levinas. In other words, I cannot escape proximity to the Other, since before I 
cognize something, I discover myself being appealed by the Other; proximity is a struc-
tural component of consciousness. In fact, such an approach to the other excludes any 
thematization or possession. The singularity of this ethical proximity excludes media-
tion through universal notions that belong to language. Language is thought to be an 
‘inter’ space that indicates the appeal of the Other. Levinas underlines this statement in 
a very poetical way: “the precise point at which this mutation of the intentional into the 
ethical occurs, and occurs continually, as the approach breaks through consciousness, 
is the human skin and face. Contact is tenderness and responsibility” [8, p. 116]. This 
special foundation of language is caused by Levinas’s desire to free language from logical 
discourse. So long as thought is the functional model governing any uses of language, it 
must remain embedded in the ideality it acquires from the basic intentional structure. 
It is for this reason that Levinas discusses the nature of the sensible in terms of intui-
tion and the metaphysical desire. The sensible, according to Levinas, can be the only 
approach to the other and it cannot be known. The sensible does not offer to conscious-
ness something which may not be integrated into the structure of the world [9, p. 36]. 
It establishes unique access to the truth. The original proximity whereby the self is re-
lated to the Other is achieved in non-verbal sensibility. “The relation of proximity <…> 
is the original language, language without words or propositions, pure communication” 
[8, p. 119]. Language is originally a wordless approach and tactile contact. To formulate 
it differently, it is nudity of skin and silence.
To sum up this part, I would like to stress that Levinas’s project of ethical exegesis is 
to re-trace the passage to transcendence, where commentary, reading, and dialogue would 
be aiming at the ethical saying within the said of the philosophical discourse. The ethical 
exegesis is not purely a practice of a contemplative mind but rather an articulation of sen-
sible embodied self, manifesting in the proximity of two interlocutors. My main claim is 
that ethical exegesis does not stand alone but is tightly bounded to the ethical body found 
at the core of subjectivity. 
Ethical body and sensibility
My guiding line in examining ethical body is the title of Levinas’s second major book 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond the Essence. Here I specifically draw attention to the state-
ment ‘otherwise than being’. Mention of ‘otherwise’ might provide the clue to Levinas’s 
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answer why one should bring into discussion embodied subjectivity. During the entire 
history of Western thought the body was understood in terms of being, but for Levinas, 
the meaning of human embodiment is revealed ‘otherwise than being’. He claims that at 
the very origin of being for the other person there is already embodied ethical expression. 
In the same spirit, in Levinasian Meditation Richard Cohen writes that each moral action 
and ethical becoming exceed being [2, p. 37]. And obviously, the human body is the moral 
body which goes beyond conceptualization of being. The development of our civilization 
was always based on our capacity to provide preservation of life and the self and of the 
body in the first place. One could see that there is indeed a certain ambiguity within dif-
ferent modalities embodied subjectivity: it is not just self-providing and satisfaction of 
needs of life, but in doing this one goes beyond animality and eventually is building up the 
ethical realm of the human. 
In its origin our embodiment is enjoyment, a satisfaction of needs, it is aging and suf-
fering, it is exposure and vulnerability. And therefore, only the vulnerable, mortal, embod-
ied being is capable of encountering an ethical demand: “a shudder of incarnation though 
which giving takes on meaning, as the primordial dative of the for another, in which a 
subject becomes a heart, a sensibility, and hands that give” [6, p. 182]. 
Thus, Levinas proposes a kind of reverse reading of any theoretical discourse. He 
believes that the starting point for the philosophy is not a divergence of mind, mental 
constructions together with embodied being; the history of philosophy and the science 
should be understood as theory and practice grounded in a concrete situation, incar-
nated in language and time, expressed in varieties of embodied subjectivity. This atti-
tude was not totally ignored in the history of Western thought. Levinas mentions that 
there are two traditions intertwined which could shed light on the concept of ethical 
embodiment. During Ancient time, and here Levinas mostly refers to Parmenides, be-
ing and time are thought within the realm of rationality, and where the body occupies 
a lower level and is often “sacrificed to eternity” [2, p. 38]. Another period comes with 
Bergson, where being and time are finally thematised in terms of existence. That was an 
important breakthrough, which assigned the body the first place. In his commentary 
on Levinas’s view of the embodiment, Cohen describes two promising lines of contem-
porary thinking. The first one, represented by Bergson and Heidegger, is revealing the 
body as an aesthetic body. Another one, and here one could also refer to Merleau-Ponty, 
is conceiving body as the ethical body. 
Levinas indeed develops a concept of ethical embodiment in a very detailed way. As 
I discussed in the previous part the ethical essence of language, from which the experi-
ence of obligation derives, originates in the sensibility of the skin of the other’s face and in 
proximity. The meaningful relation to the other is maintained by a non-verbal language 
of skin. The ethical self is an embodied being of flesh and blood, a being who is capable 
of hunger, who eats and enjoys eating — “only a being that eats can be for the Other” [1, 
p. 74]. Even though we are always tending to build up our existence on rational consid-
eration, we are ridden with all possible inclinations and aversions, desires for pleasure, 
fame, prestige, power, and love which format our sensibility. This sensibility is not only 
a desire for happiness, it is neither manifestation of pure rationality nor pure materiality. 
Describing ethical body Levinas insists on the priority of moral responsibility specified 
in terms of temporalizing unfolding body. Here, I will not touch upon a discussion of the 
temporality of the body, however, I would mention that contrary to Bergson or Heidegger 
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Levinas sees embodiment as unfolding temporal flow, as mortality and as historicity with 
an imprint of alterity and as being marked by the humanity of the other person. Levinas 
articulates that “corporeity describes the ontological regime of a primary self-alienation” 
[3, p. 226]. The body is at the same time my body, my concrete embodiment and a thing in 
the world with and for others. He writes: “The body exceeds the categories of a thing, but 
does not coincide with the role of “lived body” (“corps propre”) which I dispose of in my 
voluntary action and by which I can. The ambiguity of corporeal resistance which turns 
into a means and from means turns into a resistance does not account for its ontological 
hybrid. The body in its very activity, in its for itself, inverts into a thing to be treated as a 
thing” [3, p. 229]. Here the accent is on the embodiment emerging as mortality but also as 
justice. This is a phenomenological description of the self-presence that reveals how the 
self is built and what are the components of the embodied self which are needed in order 
to be faced by or to accept the call from the other person.
In a very short manner, I will further address these components of embodied sensi-
bility, namely Levinasian description of the formation of the ethical body including enjoy-
ment and hunger. Being not the easiest concept to read, enjoyment stands as a starting 
step towards unfolding ethical embodiment. To support this claim, I address one of the 
famous citations from Totality and Infinity: “The I is thus at home with itself. Through 
the home, our relation with space as distance and extension is substituted for the simple 
“bathing in the element”. But the adequate relation with the element is precisely bathing. 
The interiority of immersion is not convertible into exteriority. <…> To bathe in the ele-
ment is to be in an inside-out world” [3, p. 132]. This “bathing in the element” of life itself 
is also an affective experience of being at home (“chez soi”) and where dwelling manifests 
as the enjoyment of materiality of the world and of mastering it. 
Enjoyment described as “bathing in the elemental” is a pure sensibility, which is not 
originating from the first position of the I. The ego is contested by affection or, in other 
words, is melted in enjoyment without intending any purpose. In his analysis of enjoy-
ment and affective state of sensibility Levinas focuses a great deal of attention on the “con-
traction” of a sentiment which subjectivity is experiencing. An important claim here is 
that the I does not generate enjoyment and therefore is not taken as a source of enjoyment. 
Rather in this surprising state of enjoyment subjectivity does not have any chance to re-
turn to the sameness of the self in satisfaction of its need. The being of the subjectivity is 
constructed not only on the experience of enjoyment or the enjoyment of enjoyment but 
the I also builds its existence on enjoyment. Building existence on enjoyment means that 
the subject originates from affective experience of life. 
Bathing in the materiality of the world embodied subjectivity arises from self-sens-
ing of sensibility, which is gradually designed for enjoyment. The enjoyment is also re-
lated to being hungry. Levinas writes that “only a subject that eats can be for-the-other” 
[1, p. 74]. In its hunger and a constant search for satisfaction, subjectivity is for the first 
time disclosed to be vulnerable. And, together with hunger comes to pain that, to some ex-
tent, forces subjectivity to stay in modality for-itself. The sensation of hunger is truly mine, 
even though the sensation may not be fully recognized by me. It sketches and sharpens the 
existence of subjectivity as a localized body.
The hunger, but also tasting, is my embodiment where getting “food”, choosing what 
I eat, is the identification of what is me. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond the Essence 
Levinas states: “The taste is the way a sensible subject becomes a volume or the irreducible 
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event in which the spatial phenomenon of biting becomes the identification called me, in 
which it becomes me through the life that lives from its very life in a frueri vivendi” [1, 
p. 73]. The subjectivity creates its own volume or, in other words, a sense of the self, from 
the taste of what it enjoys.
Describing the emergence of the ethical body in hunger and enjoyment Levinas gradu-
ally intends to resituate a relation to transcendence. This project comprises two aspects of 
embodied sensibility: the sensibility of enjoyment before the ethical encounter and the sen-
sibility in a face-to-face encounter. It is important to note that in these two cases of sensibil-
ity, the sense bestowal comes from outside and structure of enjoyment reverses intentional-
ity in such way that it does not have noesis–noema correlation. This modality of sensibility 
grasped in enjoyment is prior to any construction of meaning and, according to Levinas, 
provides access to transcendence. The transcendental character of sensibility is eventually 
determined by the moment of the contact with the other. The profound nuance, which Levi-
nas wants to point out, is that the contact itself should not be read as a consciousness of con-
tact but rather subjectivity is subordinated to that with which it is in contact. As Levinas puts 
it, “[t]his situation is not reducible to representation, not even an articulate representation; it 
belongs to sensibility, which is the mode of enjoyment. It is when sensibility is interpreted as 
representation and mutilated thought that the finitude of our thought has to be invoked so 
as to account for these “obscure” thoughts. The sensibility we are describing starting with an 
enjoyment of the element does not belong to the order of thought but to that of sentiment, 
that is, the affectivity wherein the egoism of the I pulsates” [3, p. 135]. 
In relation to the above, it is worth pointing out that the formation of the ethical body 
is an originative component of ethical exegesis: within the confines of exegetical practice, 
one finds sensibility expressed in the ethical embodiment. Perhaps only the promise of 
responsibility born together with ethical body silently speaks within philosophical tradi-
tion. Ethical embodiment turns into a particular mode of poetic being, it is productivity 
and creativity, but also in being creative one is exposed to all dangers and violence. To be 
embodied is to be wounded with an essentially ambiguous existence: one is for oneself 
and also eventually for others. Considering the body and will, we enter into the public 
sphere. From the first enjoyment but also from being hungry, one is exposed to others 
without one’s voluntary will. The subjectivity finds itself already bounded to others and 
to all these spheres of embodied existence, which mark the human realm as opposed to a 
purely natural dimension of being. Therefore, as Levinas makes clear, one has to start with 
embodiment revealed as the ethical one: “responsibility for another is not an accident that 
happens to a subject, but precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom in which a com-
mitment to another would have been made. I have not done anything and I have always 
been under accusation — persecuted” [1, p. 114]. 
As a final mark, I should add that in the context of Levinas’s ethics the idea of the 
‘end of philosophy’ is often employed to mean the transition from philosophical theory 
to ethics. This means to address the subject of flesh and blood who cannot escape an in-
tersubjective signification, i.e. cannot escape ‘interhumanity’. As Levinas elegantly puts it: 
“The self is a sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything” 
[1, p. 116]. The reason why Levinas talks about the end of the philosophy is that the whole 
discourse of the Western philosophy was mostly developed as the said ignoring alterity 
and the other. Henceforth he denotes basic philosophical inquiry and moves to ‘ethics as 
first philosophy’. This is indeed simple but yet different ethics: to perform unsaying of the 
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said by the outlining importance of the approach to the other interlocutor that is articu-
lated as ethical exegesis and originated in ethical body and sensibility.
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Цель статьи — показать, что тезис Левинаса «этика как первая философия» предпола-
гает радикально иной подход к философскому дискурсу и языку. Анализируя позицию 
Левинаса, автор демонстрирует, каким образом пересматривается паттерн прочтения 
и дискутирования, традиционно присущий западному философскому мышлению. Это 
предполагает определенные концептуальные шаги, описанные как этический экзегезис 
и этическое тело. Этический экзегезис представляет собой практику «слушать другого» 
и «быть для другого собеседника», которая направлена прежде всего на воплощенно-
го субъекта во всех проявлениях его жизненного мира. Чтобы продемонстрировать 
принцип работы экзегезиса в модальностях чувствительности и воплощенной близо-
сти, в рамках феноменологической традиции автор рассматривает концепцию языка 
в философии Левинаса, а именно говорение и сказанное. Таким образом, основной те-
зис статьи состоит в следующем: Левинас не только пересматривает функционирова-
ние языка в философском дискурсе, но и открывает новые подходы к диалогу, способам 
участия и слушанию. Иными словами, объективирующий язык оказывается подчинен-
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ным этическому экзегезису, который описан Левинасом как встреча с воплощенным 
другим. Именно поэтому особое внимание уделяется рассмотрению структур чувстви-
тельности (наслаждение и голод) и близости, которые являются необходимыми компо-
нентами, формирующими этическое тело. В статье поясняется также, что постоянное 
уточнение Левинасом концепции экзегезиса в различных его работах направлено на 
возвращение и приближение к трансценденции. 
Ключевые слова: Левинас, этика, экзегезис, воплощение, близость, чувствительность, 
этическое тело, язык, говорение, сказанное. 
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